Between Ownership and Care
- In short: On 6 May 2024, a new provision — s 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) — commenced under the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth). It permits courts to consider an animal’s care, attachment, and welfare when making parenting or property orders.
- The amendment responds to a long-standing disjunction: pets are woven into daily life, yet treated in law as divisible property.
- While the legal classification remains unchanged, the reform opens space for courts to weigh relational and caregiving dynamics that previously sat outside the property frame.
- It marks a measured shift — not in doctrine, but in what courts are allowed to hear when families separate.
In the process of resolving family law disputes, pets present a complication. Within most households, they are enmeshed in the rhythm of family life — doted on, folded into routines, treated as part of the household. But in legal proceedings, they are classified as property. This creates a mismatch between the reality of family life with animals and the legal framework used to resolve disputes about them. It reveals the difficulty of accounting for something relational and responsive within a system designed to allocate assets.
The matter of Grunseth & Wighton [2022] FedCFamC1A 132 arose as part of post-separation property proceedings and included a dispute about who would retain the parties’ dog. While not the largest item in the asset pool, the question of ownership became a focal point.
“It reveals the difficulty of accounting for something relational and responsive within a system designed to allocate assets.”
At trial, the husband, represented by counsel, submitted that he had purchased the dog, was financially responsible for its care, and had made arrangements for its ongoing welfare. He also gave evidence that the dog had lived primarily with him since separation. The wife, who was self-represented, argued that the dog had been a shared companion throughout the relationship and that she had provided much of the day-to-day care — including feeding, grooming, and companionship.
Despite these details, the trial judge treated the dog as a chattel — a form of personal property. The question was not who the animal was bonded to, but how it should be allocated according to traditional property principles. Contribution, ownership, and possession were the guiding concepts. Emotional attachment or daily care were not treated as relevant to the property division. The dog was ultimately retained by the husband.
The wife appealed. Among other grounds, she challenged the trial judge’s characterisation of the dog as a mere chattel and argued that the Court had failed to consider the depth of her connection to the animal and her caregiving role. She sought to have the matter reconsidered on the basis that the law ought to reflect the lived significance of pets in family life — not just their financial or proprietary value.
The Full Court dismissed the appeal. In its reasons, the Court confirmed that pets are to be treated as items of property, and that there was no error in the trial judge applying orthodox principles of contribution and ownership. At [65], the Court stated: “Pets and livestock are property to be valued in the usual way.”
No alternative framework was proposed. The Court declined to engage with the relational dimensions of the dispute, or with the emotional significance the animal held for either party.
While the case does not establish new doctrine, it reinforces the prevailing position: that animals in family law proceedings are to be valued and allocated like other forms of personal property. In doing so, it reveals the limitations of a system that accounts for legal ownership, but not for emotional meaning, relational bonds, or caregiving history.
“The dog was treated as a chattel — no different in principle from furniture or a motor vehicle.”
It is a framing that often jars with lived experience — especially where pets offer comfort, continuity, or connection in the midst of family change.
These frameworks operate independently—some relying on self-reporting, others on employer referral or Part 5A disclosures.
Among the suite of reforms introduced by the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) — many of which commenced on 6 May 2024 — was a quiet but meaningful change to the way courts may approach property matters involving pets. For the first time, courts dividing property under sections 79 or 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) are expressly permitted to consider “the care, welfare and emotional bonds” relating to an animal.
This does not alter the legal classification of pets as property. But it introduces a discretion — one that opens space to consider how animals function within a household, beyond ownership and value.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 described the reform as recognising the role of animals in families and allowing for a more holistic assessment of property interests, by enabling the court to consider “the care, welfare and emotional bonds with animals in property settlements” (Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth) [251]).
In introducing the Bill, the then Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus KC MP, stated that the change “reflects the importance of pets in the lives of families, including their role in providing companionship and support, particularly for children, and the need to consider their wellbeing when families separate” (Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 March 2023, 2164 (Mark Dreyfus, Attorney-General)).
The reform marks a shift in posture, signaling a willingness to move beyond purely financial frameworks. It recognises that decisions about animals may involve emotional and relational dimensions — particularly after separation.
The 2024 decision in Rowlinson & Bradford (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1241 provides a clear example of the court engaging with the new property discretion under section 79(4)(e) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which permits consideration of an animal’s care, welfare, and emotional bonds. While the matter concerned modest assets, its reasoning reflects a quiet shift in legal posture.
Following separation, the parties disagreed over the future care of two family dogs. The dogs had remained with the wife and children under interim arrangements. At final hearing, the husband sought to retain one of the dogs or, alternatively, proposed that both be sold or rehomed.
“The dog may be property at law, but it is not a piece of furniture. It is a living being and should be treated with compassion.”
The wife opposed that proposal. She submitted that the dogs were primarily attached to the children, that she had been their main caregiver, and that continuity of care was in their best interests. She also pointed to the children’s emotional bond with the animals and the role they played in household routines.
The husband’s case was framed in proprietary terms. He relied on financial contribution to the purchase and maintenance of the dogs and argued that they should be treated like any other divisible asset. The wife, who had assumed day-to-day responsibility for the dogs, emphasised care, routine, and emotional connection. She submitted that the dogs were companions to the children and should remain with them.
Justice Betts accepted that the dogs formed part of the property pool, but noted that section 79(4)(e) now permitted the court to consider factors beyond ownership or value. Her Honour acknowledged the relational role the dogs played within the household and the stability they provided to the children. In doing so, Her Honour stated: “The dog may be property at law, but it is not a piece of furniture. It is a living being and should be treated with compassion.”
That observation, while brief, captured the broader tenor of the reasoning. The Court recognised the emotional significance of the dogs and the practical arrangements already in place, and declined to disturb their care.
The Court ordered that both dogs remain with the wife and children. While the orders were framed within the structure of property law, the reasoning reflected a more nuanced understanding of how animals function in post-separation households. Emotional attachment was not elevated into a legal test, but it was permitted to shape the outcome.
The classification of pets as property has not changed. A dog or cat remains, in law, an item within the asset pool — something to be retained, transferred, or accounted for. But the language available to courts has shifted. It now permits attention to caregiving, continuity, and emotional bond — elements previously excluded from the legal framework.
That shift may not alter the final order in every case. But it changes how parties frame their submissions, how evidence is led, and how the emotional weight of certain claims is received. The question is no longer simply one of purchase or upkeep. It is, at least in part, a question of care.
“The law is beginning to reflect what many families already know. That animals are not just owned — they are lived with.”
These are early signals. The provision is discretionary, and its application will vary. But the reform offers something that was not there before: an invitation to treat relational realities as legally relevant — not determinative, but not out of place.
In that sense, the law is beginning to reflect what many families already know. That animals are not just owned — they are lived with. And that sometimes, resolving where they belong requires more than the language of property alone.